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I. Introduction 
Rising healthcare costs have had a devastating impact on many 
American families in recent years.1 One of the main drivers of this national 
problem is the price consumers must pay for prescription drugs.2 Although 
rising prescription drug costs place a heavy burden on all individuals, they 
are most harmful to those who cannot afford health insurance or those 
dependent on prescription drugs due to chronic illness.3 Of particular 
concern are the poor and the elderly, who are more prone to chronic 
conditions that require long-term care.4 Without more affordable options, 
these groups do not have access to many of the therapies they need in order 
to sustain a healthy life, including the newer, more expensive prescription 
drugs.5 
                                                                                                     
 1. See AMERICA’S HEALTH INS. PLANS, BOARD OF DIRECTORS STATEMENT: BRINGING 
DOWN HEALTHCARE COSTS 1 (2013), available at http://www.ahip.org/ 
BoardofDirectorsStatements/ (stating that soaring healthcare costs force “[w]orking families 
and seniors [to] face difficult choices between the basic necessities of living and needed 
health care”). 
 2. See Dennis Cauchon, Drug Prices Jump Again While Other Health Costs Decline, 
USA TODAY (Feb. 13, 2013, 8:09PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/ 
2013/02/13/price-of-a-prescription-rising-again/1918099/ (citing data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis that shows drug prices increased at twice the rate of inflation in 2012). 
 3. See Ron Claiborne & Jessica Hopper, Price of Brand-Name Drugs Soars, ABC 
NEWS (Aug. 25, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/cost-brand-drugs-soars-hurting-elderly-
americans-fixed/story?id=11478210 (noting that those who cannot afford health insurance 
are likely on fixed incomes and must bear the full cost of medical expenses out-of-pocket). 
 4. See Soonim Huh, et al., Prescription Drug Coverage and Effects of Drug 
Expenditures Among Elderly Medicare Beneficiaries, 43 HEALTH SERV. RES. 810, 811 (June 
2008), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC 2442248/pdf/hesr0043-
0810.pdf (“Rapid growth of prescription drug expenditures is likely to disproportionately 
influence the elderly because they are more dependent upon them than any other group, due 
to high prevalence of chronic conditions that require long-term medications.”).  
 5. See The Commonwealth Fund, Prescription Drug Nonadherence: Elderly Adults, 
THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Perfor 
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One of the ways Americans have been able to minimize their 
healthcare spending is through substituting less expensive generic 
medications for more expensive patented branded pharmaceuticals.6 
However, spending on prescription drugs remains high, suggesting that 
generic substitution has not met its full potential.7 One reason for this 
problem is arguably an active effort by drug manufacturers to keep generic 
drugs from entering the market,8 leading to an artificial maintenance of high 
drug prices for tens of millions of Americans.9 Drug manufacturers have 
been able to accomplish this through the use of reverse payment or “pay-
for-delay” settlement agreements.  
Reverse payment settlement agreements arise where a generic 
manufacturer attempts to enter the market by producing a generic version of 
a brand name drug.10 The manufacturer of the branded version files a 
lawsuit for patent infringement, and the generic manufacturer defends the 
suit on the ground that the patent is invalid or the generic drug does not 
infringe the patent.11 Instead of litigating the patent dispute, the generic and 
brand-name manufacturer strike a settlement agreement whereby the 
generic manufacturer agrees not to bring a competing drug to market for an 
agreed-upon period of time.12 In return, the brand-name drug manufacturer 
                                                                                                     
mance-Snapshots/Unmet-Needs-for-Health-Care/Prescription-Drug-Nonadherence--Elderly-
Adults.aspx (“More than one-quarter of seniors reported that they did not fill or adhere to a 
prescription for cost-related reasons in 2003.”). 
 6. See David A. Mott & Richard R. Cline, Exploring Generic Drug Use Behavior: 
The Role of Prescribers and Pharmacists in the Opportunity for Generic Drug Use and 
Generic Substitution, 40 MEDICAL CARE 662, 663 (2002), available at http://www. 
jstor.org/stable/3767620 (noting that spending on drugs can be reduced through the use of 
prescription drugs due to the high cost differential between generic and brand-name drugs). 
 7. See Press Release, RAND Corporation, Financial Burden of Prescription Drugs is 
Dropping, But Costs Remain a Challenge For Many Families (Feb. 8, 2012), available at 
http://www.rand.org/news/press/2012/02/08/index1.html (stating that generics have help 
decrease healthcare expenditures for Americans but prescription costs remain a challenge for 
low-income individuals). 
 8. See U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, TOP-TWENTY PAY-FOR-DELAY 
DRUGS, U.S. PIRG), available at http://uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/Top_Twenty_ 
Pay_For_DelayDrugs_USPIRG.pdf [hereinafter U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP] 
(stating that pay-for-delay settlements has held back the introduction of many generic 
drugs). 
 9. See generally Mott & Cline, supra note 6 (giving a brief overview of the negative 
impact reverse payment settlement agreements can have on consumers through delayed 
generic entry of key drugs). 
 10. 2 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELL. PROP. AND ANTITRUST LAW § 38:3 (2013). 
 11. See id. (stating that reverse payment settlement agreements arise out of patent 
infringement suits). 
 12. See id. (stating that compensation is paid to the infringer “in return for the 
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compensates the generic manufacturer, typically by a large monetary 
payment.13 Although these agreements can avoid costly litigation, they can 
also substantially harm competition and consumers. That is true where the 
agreement delays the entry of a generic drug but the court would have 
found the patent invalid or not infringed. Therefore, had litigation 
continued, the generic would have been permitted to enter the market 
earlier than permitted by the reverse payment agreement.14 Thus, reverse 
payment agreements can provide a way for brand-name manufacturers with 
invalid or non-infringed patents to stave off competition in the drug market, 
potentially allowing the brand-name manufacturer to continue to charge 
supracompetitive prices by leaving consumers without a cheaper generic 
alternative.15 Because of their potential adverse effect on consumer 
healthcare expenditures, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has made 
ending reverse payment agreements one of its top priorities since the late 
1990’s.16 
If reverse payment settlement agreements have the potential to harm 
consumers and competition, why haven’t the courts eliminated these 
agreements altogether? While reverse payment agreements may run against 
the antitrust policy of maximizing competition in the marketplace, holders 
of valid, infringed patents see these payments as a way to exercise their 
right under the patent laws to exclude others from infringing their patents 
and to reduce litigation costs.17 If the patent is valid and a generic 
                                                                                                     
infringer’s agreement to refrain from producing or selling its allegedly infringing product for 
an agreed period ending on or before expiration of the patentee’s patent”). 
 13. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text (discussing the basic structure of a 
reverse payment agreement). 
 14. See discussion infra Parts II.B., III. 
 15. See Pay-for-Delay Deals: Limiting Competition and Costing Consumers: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Comp. Pol’y, and Consumer Rights, 113th Cong. 2 
(2013) (statement of George Slover, Consumers Union), available at 
http://consumersunion.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/generic_drug_pay_for_delay_statem
ent_0813.pdf (stating that reverse payment settlements have been used to eliminate generic 
entry, “thereby prolonging the period during which [brand-name drug makers] can charge 
monopoly prices to consumers who need the drug and have no alternative”). 
 16. See Pay-For-Delay Deals: Limiting Competition and Costing Consumers: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Comp. Pol’y, and Consumer Rights, 113th Cong. 1 
(2013) (statement of the Federal Trade Commission), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-federal-
trade-commission-pay-delay-deals-limiting-competition-and-costing/130723payfordelay.pdf. 
 17. See Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 761, 766–69 (2002) (discussing the fact that both antitrust law and patent law share the 
same objective of increasing consumer welfare but their paths in achieving this goal often 
diverge and conflict). 
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manufacturer infringes on that patent, the patent holder should be able to 
settle a patent infringement in lieu of undergoing time-consuming, costly, 
and unpredictable patent litigation. Antitrust proponents, however, believe 
that patent holders are using such settlements as a device to unlawfully 
exclude competition based on an invalid or non-infringed patent.18  
Given the widely divergent views held on the appropriate legal 
framework for analyzing reverse payment agreements, such agreements 
have been one of the most discussed antitrust topics over the past two 
decades.19 The topic came to the forefront in the summer of 2013, when the 
Supreme Court decided FTC v. Actavis.20 In Actavis, the Court was asked to 
settle a circuit split about the antitrust standard that courts should apply in 
determining the lawfulness of these types of agreements; that is, given their 
potential anticompetitive effects, the appropriate depth of scrutiny for 
determining the effect on competition of the agreements and thus their 
lawfulness under the antitrust laws.21 Because reverse payment agreements 
have the potential to restrain competition, the Court held that they should be 
subjected to the “rule of reason” analysis.22 Prior to the Court’s decision, 
most circuit courts of appeals used the more name-brand-manufacturer-
friendly “scope-of-the-patent test,” whereby the settlement would be 
unlawful only if the exclusion under the agreement exceeded the right of 
exclusion provided by the patent laws.23  This would be the case in only 
very limited situations and thus critics argued that reverse payment 
settlement agreements were effectively per se legal, causing substantial 
consumer harm.24 
                                                                                                     
 18. See HOLMES, supra note 10 (noting that patent holders believe that engaging in 
these agreements falls within their right to exclude others from producing infringing 
products while antitrust proponents believe these agreements go beyond the intended scope 
of patent laws). 
 19. See Kenneth Glazer & Jenée Desmond-Harris, Reverse Payments: Hard Cases 
Even Under Good Law, 24 ANTITRUST 14, 14 (Spring 2010) (noting that “reverse payments 
remain one of the most contentious areas of antitrust”). 
 20. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237–38 (2013) (holding that reverse 
payment settlement agreements should be analyzed under rule of reason and tasked the 
lower courts with developing “the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation”). 
 21. See discussion infra Part VII (discussing the details and implications of Actavis at 
length).  
 22. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 at 2226 (2013) (declining to hold that reverse 
payments are presumptively unlawful and therefore they should be analyzed under “rule of 
reason” analysis). 
 23. See discussion infra Part VI.B (discussing the different antitrust standards lower 
courts applied to reverse payment settlement agreements before Actavis was decided). 
 24. See discussion infra Part VI.B. 
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Although the Actavis decision has been touted as a victory for 
consumers and the FTC because reverse payment agreements will be 
subjected to a more stringent antitrust standard than before, the general 
consensus is that this ruling provided more questions than answers. Among 
the questions most discussed is whether the Court intends for lower courts 
to apply “full-blown” rule of reason analysis to these types of agreements.25 
Although this topic will be discussed in the following sections, the most 
important issue raised by Actavis for the purposes of this Note is how the 
ruling will affect the cost of healthcare for consumers, especially the poor 
and elderly, and the likelihood that legislation will be enacted in order to 
adequately protect these groups. 
Part II of this Note provides background to the concept of reverse 
payment settlements, focusing on legislation passed in the mid-1980s that 
inadvertently gave rise to these types of agreements. Part III examines the 
impact reverse payment agreements have on competition, noting that these 
agreements can have both anticompetitive and procompetitive effects. Part 
IV addresses how anticompetitive reverse payments affect consumers, 
particularly the poor and the elderly. Part V summarizes recent 
congressional bills introduced to eliminate reverse payment settlement 
agreements.  Part VI provides an overview of how lower courts addressed 
the legality of reverse payment before Actavis was decided. Part VII 
discusses the Actavis decision and the major questions the Court created, 
including the exact standard the Court expects lower courts to apply and 
what constitutes a “large and unjustified” reverse payment as that phrase 
was used by the Court. Part VIII discusses the possible implications of 
Actavis on consumer welfare as well as the likelihood that congressional 
action will take place to further reduce the prevalence of reverse payment 
agreements. Part VIII also argues that recent changes in the national 
healthcare landscape could also reduce the burden prescription drug costs 
have on poor and elderly Americans. This Note concludes that the Actavis 
decision should allow Americans greater access to needed prescription 
drugs. 
                                                                                                     
 25. See infra Part VII.A–C (providing an extensive discussion of the standard adopted 
by the Court in reverse payment cases and the most likely way lower courts will apply that 
standard). 
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II.  Background: Reverse Payment Settlement Agreements and the Hatch-
Waxman Act 
A.  Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
Competition in the pharmaceutical industry is difficult to maintain, 
which is why patent protection is very important in ensuring new drugs are 
brought to market.26 Pioneer drug companies are exposed to major risks 
when deciding to develop new drug therapies because development requires 
high sunk costs and extensive regulatory compliance.27 Competition could 
prevent brand-name drug manufacturers from recouping the R&D and 
regulatory costs associated with inventing a new drug and bringing it to 
market, eliminating the incentive for manufacturers to develop new drugs 
necessary to increase public welfare.28  
Despite the importance of patent protection in this industry, Congress 
found that competition in the pharmaceutical industry was wholly 
inadequate. After 1962, congressional testimony revealed that there were 
150 brand-name drugs off patent for which there was no generic 
counterpart.29 For generic manufacturers, the time and money required to 
bring a new drug to market was simply too great to induce the effort.30 
Through the Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984,31 
also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress sought to increase the 
entry of low-cost generics by reducing the regulatory burdens required of 
generic manufacturers in bringing a generic drug to market.32 Since its 
                                                                                                     
 26. See Emily Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 251 
(2012) (noting that patent protection is important in the pharmaceutical industry because it is 
“one of the most cost- and time-intensive areas of technological innovation . . .”). 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. (stating the importance of patent protection in the drug industry because, 
“[i]dentifying a compound with possible therapeutic benefits is only the first of many slow 
and incredibly expensive steps, and the cost of discovering, testing, and marketing new 
drugs is extremely high and continues to rise”). 
 29. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on 
the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999) (stating that no 
generics were entering the market because “generic companies simply would not spend the 
time and money doing the clinical trials to get to market, . . .”). 
 30. See id. at 194 (stating that, “[t]he robust generic drug industry owes its very 
existence to the Act, . . .”). 
 31. Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012). 
 32. See Morris, supra note 26, at 248 (“The Hatch-Waxman Act therefore promotes 
generic market entry by relieving almost all of the regulatory burdens for generic 
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enactment, the Hatch-Waxman Act has had a significant impact on 
competition in the pharmaceutical industry.33 Today, almost every top-
selling drug faces generic competition whereas there were only generic 
equivalents available for 35% of brand-name drugs prior to Hatch-
Waxman.34 Further, 70% of prescriptions today are filled by generics 
whereas generics only comprised 15% of the pre-Hatch-Waxman 
prescription drug market.35 The result has been millions of dollars in cost 
savings for Medicaid and Medicare—and commercial health plans and 
consumers—due to generic substitution programs.36 
The Hatch-Waxman Act increased competition by streamlining the 
process for generic drug approval, consequently creating an incentive for 
generic manufacturers to enter the market.37 Prior to this Act, generic drug 
manufacturers, like branded-drug manufacturers, had to submit and obtain 
approval of a New Drug Application (NDA) before the FDA approved their 
drug.38 Filing a NDA is an extremely costly and time-consuming process.39 
Generic drug manufacturers were forced to submit clinical data verifying a 
drug’s safety and efficacy even though a brand name manufacturer had 
already undergone the NDA approval process using identical data for a 
bioequivalent drug.40  
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic drug manufacturers are able to 
skip this process by filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), 
                                                                                                     
manufacturers, as well as by helping generic manufacturers challenge the validity of brand-
name pharmaceutical patents that might be hindering such market entry.”). 
 33. See Glazer & Desmond-Harris, supra note 19, at 14 (“The emergence of a 
successful generic drug industry has often been attributed to the Act . . . .”). 
 34. Martha M. Rumore, The Hatch-Waxman Act-25 Years Later: Keeping the 
Pharmaceutical Scales Balanced, PHARMACYTIMES (Aug. 15, 2009), 
http://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/supplement/2009/GenericSupplement0809
/Generic-HatchWaxman-0809#sthash.kKlxbMSX.dpuf. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, et al., Extensions Of Intellectual Property Rights And 
Delayed Adoption Of Generic Drugs:  Effects On Medicaid Spending, 15 HEALTH AFFAIRS 
1637, 1638 (2006), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/25/6/1637.full#ref-8 
(“Several reports have detailed millions of dollars in cost savings achievable through 
generic-substitution policies employed by government and private payers.”). 
 37. See Glazer & Desmond-Harris, supra note 19, at 15 (stating that the approval 
process was significantly streamlined because the Act allowed “generic manufacturers to 
circumvent the lengthy and expensive NDA filing by filing instead an Abbreviated New 
Drug Application (ANDA)”). 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. 
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which allows the generic drug manufacturer to use the safety and efficacy 
data gathered and submitted by the brand-name manufacturer to complete 
its original NDA.41 The generic drug manufacturer need only supplement 
the original NDA with data showing that the generic drug is the 
“bioequivalent” of the already-approved brand-name drug.42 If approved, an 
ANDA filer is given a 180-day exclusivity period in which no other generic 
manufacturer can have an ANDA approved that covers the same drug.43 
This exclusivity period can be very profitable for the “first filer.” It creates 
a generic drug “bottleneck,” excluding other generics from the market, thus 
allowing the first filer to charge a higher price than it otherwise would be 
able do if other generics were allowed to enter the market.44 
In order to maintain the balance between innovation and competition, 
the Hatch-Waxman Act provides safeguards to protect the brand-name 
manufacturer from infringement of its patent. For example, Congress 
recognized that it takes a long time for the FDA to approve a drug after a 
patent holder files the NDA for that drug.45 During this time period, the 
patent holder is losing months off the patent’s life. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
adds back one half of the patent life lost during this time period to the 
exclusionary period of the patent.46 Also, the generic drug manufacturer 
seeking approval through an ANDA must submit a certification 1) that the 
drug is not covered by an existing patent, 2) that if there is a patent that the 
patent has expired, 3) providing information regarding the expiration date 
of such existing patent, and 4) that if there is an existing patent, the patent is 
invalid or will not be infringed upon by the generic drug manufacturer.47 
Once this “Paragraph IV” certification is filed, patent holders of brand-
name drugs may bring a patent-infringement claim against an ANDA filer 
within forty-five days of the first filer’s ANDA filing if they believe the 
                                                                                                     
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(5)(b)(IV)(iv) (2012). 
 44. If other generics were allowed to enter the market during the exclusivity period, 
the sole generic would be forced to lower its price to a competitive level, or else lose 
consumers to the other generics willing to charge a lower price. Without competition, there 
is no incentive for the generic to lower its price because consumers do not have a competitor 
to turn to.  See Bret Dickey et al., An Economic Assessment of Patent Settlements in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 367, 373 (2010). 
 45. See Morris, supra note 26, at 260. 
 46. See Id. (“[T]he Hatch-Waxman Act provides for restoration of patent term equal to 
one-half of the time period from the start of human clinical trials to NDA approval and all of 
the time spent during the NDA approval process itself.”). 
 47. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012). 
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generic drug infringes on their patent.48 This is colloquially called 
“Paragraph IV litigation.” If a patent holder challenges the ANDA, the 
approval of the ANDA is automatically stayed for thirty months.49  
B.  The Development of Reverse Payment Settlement Agreements 
To understand how reverse payments can affect competition and 
consumer drug prices, an explanation of how reverse payments develop is 
necessary.50 As part of the “procompetitive thrust” of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, the Act facilitates and encourages challenges to a patent’s validity.51 
Aside from the valuable 180-day exclusivity period afforded to the first 
filer, the generic challenger is also free to challenge an existing patent by 
creating a patent-infringing generic with little risk. This is because, at best, 
the subsequent challenge by the patent holder can be characterized as an 
“artificial” patent infringement suit, as the generic manufacturer has neither 
marketed nor sold an infringing drug before the suit is filed.52 Because the 
generic manufacturer has not yet infringed on the patent holder’s patent, the 
generic manufacturer is not at risk of being held liable for damages when 
challenging a patent.53  
The brand-name manufacturer must accept this challenge because the 
structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act almost requires the brand-name 
manufacturer to bring a patent infringement suit against the generic, or else 
lose its patent. If the brand-name manufacturer does not file suit, the 
generic drug will enter the market immediately once its ANDA is 
                                                                                                     
 48. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012). 
 49. Id. This “thirty-month” provision is particularly important in the context of reverse 
payment settlements because it encourages patent holders to file suit and enjoy the thirty-
month stay rather than immediately lose the exclusivity of their patent. 
 50. The mechanics of reverse payment settlements can be difficult to grasp. For a 
better understanding of this concept, see infra Part VI.B and for recent examples, see infra 
Part VII.  
 51. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2225–26 (2013) (noting that the Hatch-
Waxman Act facilitates patent challenges and requires parties in a Paragraph IV dispute to 
report the settlement agreement to the government). 
 52. See Robin P. Sumner & Melissa J. Hatch, A Turducken Task:  How Actavis Invites 
Relitigation of Patent Merits in Reverse Payment Cases, 29 No. 10 WESTLAW J. PHARM. 12 
at *4 n.13 (Nov. 26, 2013) (noting that a generic challenger is not liable for damages 
because it has not actually marketed an infringing product). 
 53. See id. 
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approved,54 and the branded manufacturer will typically lose a substantial 
volume of business.  
The result is that the Hatch-Waxman Act achieved its goal of 
increasing the number of patent challenges. But it also increased the 
number of patent infringement suits filed.55 These patent infringement suits 
often end in a settlement between the parties.56 The structure of these 
settlements is quite unique because the patent holder pays off the patent-
infringing generic manufacturer in return for the generic manufacturer’s 
promise not to enter the market.57 The opposite direction in which these 
payments flow is the reason they are called “reverse payment 
settlements.”58 
The antitrust concerns in reverse payments are two-fold. First, under a 
reverse payment agreement, the brand-name manufacturer is able to 
maintain monopoly power with a patent that may have been found invalid 
or not infringed had litigation continued. Second, the generic manufacturer, 
instead of bringing a competitive drug to market, essentially shares the 
branded manufacturer’s profits resulting from its supracompetitive prices.59 
These agreements not only have the effect of taking the first filer’s generic 
out of the market, but they also prevent other generics from trying to enter 
the market before the parties have settled.60 As a result, consumers are not 
                                                                                                     
 54. See id. 
 55. See Wansheng Jerry Liu, Balancing Accessibility and Sustainability:  How to 
Achieve the Dual Objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act While Resolving Antitrust Issues in 
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement Cases, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 441, 443 (2008) (noting 
that one of the intentions behind the Hatch-Waxman Act was to increase challenges to brand 
name drug companies’ patents before the expiration of such patents). 
 56. See Dickey et al., supra note 44, at 367, 373–74 (“From 1992 to 2000, nearly forty 
percent of litigations against the first ANDA filer resulted in a settlement.”). 
 57. See id. at 374 (listing a number of forms that reverse payment settlements typically 
take). If, on the other hand, the patent would have been found valid and infringed upon had 
litigation continued, the reverse payment would have no adverse effect on competition.  See 
also infra Part III. 
 58. These agreements take place in reverse because the patent holder bringing suit 
against an alleged infringer (the generic manufacturer) pays the infringer rather than the 
infringer paying the patent holder for their potentially infringing conduct. See HOLMES, 
supra note 10. 
 59. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013) (stating that reverse 
payment settlements have the effect of setting “prices at patentee-set levels, potentially 
producing the full patent-related . . . monopoly return while dividing that return between the 
challenged patentee and the patent challenger”). 
 60. Several provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act make this the case. First, subsequent 
generic challengers have no incentive to bring additional challenges to a weak patent 
because they cannot benefit from the 180-day exclusivity period. Because competing 
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able to benefit from the cost savings they would have realized had the 
generic entered the market and taken business from the brand-name 
manufacturer.61  The generic’s entrance into the market would reduce the 
branded manufacturer’s market power, likely forcing it to reduce its price to 
compete with the lower-priced generic drug. 
III.  The Impact of Reverse Payments on Competition 
As noted above, reverse payment settlement agreements can have 
procompetitive effects by reducing litigation costs and allowing generics to 
enter the market sooner than they otherwise would.62 But these agreements 
also carry the major risk of stifling competition. The key indicators of the 
effect a particular reverse payment will have on competition are the 
strength of the underlying patent and whether, if the patent is valid, the 
generic drug infringes it. If a patent is strong and infringed, a reverse 
payment agreement that forces the generic manufacturer to delay entry into 
the future but allows the generic to enter before the expiration of the patent 
will not be anticompetitive or harm consumers.63 Without such an 
agreement, the generic would not be able to enter the market until the 
expiration of the patent. But under the agreement, the generic would be 
allowed to enter into the market sooner than otherwise—a procompetitive 
result.64 However, if the underlying patent is weak and likely to be found 
                                                                                                     
generics are not likely to challenge the patent, they will wait until both parties have settled 
their patent infringement claim before filing their own ANDA with the FDA. And like the 
first filer they must wait approximately thirty months before the FDA gives its approval 
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).  See id. at 2235. 
 61. See Glazer & Desmond-Harris, supra note 19, at 15 (stating that reverse payments 
allow the generic manufacturer and brand-name manufacturer to split monopoly profits, 
profits that would have trickled down to consumers in the form of cost savings had the 
generic been allowed to enter the market). 
 62. See supra notes 10–17 and accompanying text (stating that reverse payments can 
have both procompetitive and anticompetitive effects). 
 63. See Dickey et al., supra note 44, at 376–77 (“If the patent is quite strong, and 
likely to be found valid and infringed, then even a settlement with an agreed-upon entry date 
well into the future, but before the patent’s expiration, may bring generic drugs to market 
sooner than the expected outcome from continued litigation.”). 
 64. I believe this is a point many often ignore when they criticize the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Actavis. Although reverse payments may result in higher prices for consumers, 
many actually reduce drug prices by enabling generics to enter the market sooner. See, e.g., 
Alex Galvan, A Second Opinion on Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settlements:  Why 
Actavis Missed the Mark, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 586 (2014) (stating that the Court 
should have applied quick-look analysis to reverse payments because they eliminate 
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invalid or if the generic drug were non-infringing, a delayed entry would be 
anticompetitive. The fact that reverse payment agreements can be 
procompetitive or anticompetitive has led to extensive debate and 
inconsistent court decisions over the last twenty years as to where these 
agreements fit in antitrust law.65 
IV.  The Impact of Reverse Payments on Consumers 
Although reverse payment settlements have the potential to be 
procompetitive, it appears that the net result of these types of agreements is 
a substantial loss to consumers. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
found that reverse payment agreements cost American consumers an 
estimated $3.5 billion per year in savings because brand-name drugs are ten 
times more expensive than their generic counterparts.66 Consumers are 
prevented from enjoying these low-cost generics because reverse payment 
agreements delay generic market entry by approximately seventeen 
months.67 Therefore, if a consumer is forced to spend $300 per month for a 
prescription drug when a marketable generic is available for $30, a delay 
due to a reverse payment agreement of seventeen months would cost a 
single consumer $4,950 over the delay period.68 A drug cost increase of 
                                                                                                     
competition “and the consumer is left to pay the (high) price”). 
 65. See id. at 384 (“While the potential for patent settlements to be procompetitive is 
generally recognized by economists, antitrust agencies, and the courts, ‘reverse payment’ 
settlements have generated extensive debate in recent years.”). 
 66. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY:  HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST 
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 2 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-
trade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf. This figure seems to rest on 
assumptions not fully explained in the FTC’s report. Most importantly, the report might be 
making the assumption that all reverse payment agreements will cost consumers. It does not 
fully explain instances where, had litigation continued, the patent would have been found 
valid and infringed upon. In these cases, a settlement between the parties would result in the 
generic entering the market sooner than it otherwise would have. See supra Part III. 
However, the report does state that “generics prevailed in 73% of the patent litigation 
ultimately resolved by a court decision between 1992 and June 2002,” indicating the 
challenged patents are often invalid. See FED. TRADE COMM’N at 3. 
 67. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 66, at 4. 
 68. These figures are based on a hypothetical generic drug costing $300 per month 
used by the FTC staff in the making of this report. However, the report cited by the FTC 
highlights twenty popular brand name drugs affected by reverse payments. It shows that a 
brand name drug costing $300 per month is not unusual and the cost of its generic 
counterpart on average is ten times less than the brand name counterpart, but can be as much 
as thirty-three times cheaper. See id. 
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almost $5,000 would be difficult for many Americans to stomach; 
particularly considering that in 2012 over half of elderly Medicare 
recipients had annual incomes lower than $22,500.69  
Even more concerning is the fact that these reverse payments are 
particularly harmful to historically underrepresented Americans, 
specifically the poor and the elderly. These groups are most affected by 
inflated drug prices because they are least able to afford medication and the 
most at-risk for chronic medical conditions.70 Further, Americans who are 
elderly or uninsured are much more likely to forgo needed prescriptions due 
to cost and unavailability.71 In fact, according to the AARP, “having a 
generic option is often the difference between having access to a healthcare 
treatment and not having any treatment option at all.”72 The harsh reality is 
that many Americans need generic drugs in order to stay alive.73 To further 
exacerbate the problem, the need for prescription drugs is steadily 
increasing and spending on national healthcare has quadrupled in the last 
decade and a half.74  
Reverse payment settlements have also proven to be a major burden on 
the national healthcare system. A study conducted by the U.S. Public 
Interest Research Group (U.S. PIRG) found that reverse payments affect the 
                                                                                                     
 69. See 10 Years Later:  A Look at the Medicare Prescription Drug Program: Hearing 
Before the Senate Special Commission on Aging, 113th Cong. 10 (2013) (statement by 
Robert G. Romasco, AARP President), available at http://www.aging.senate.gov/imo/media/ 
doc/04_Romasco_5_22_131.pdf.  
 70. See Brief for AARP, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at *1, FTC v. 
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., 133 S. Ct. 787 (2013) (No. 12-416) (“Affordable 
prescription medication is particularly important to the older population which, because of 
its higher rates of chronic and serious health conditions, has experienced an increasing rate 
of prescription drug use.”). 
 71. See Ellyn R. Boukus & Emily R. Carrier, Americans’ Access to Prescription 
Drugs Stabilizes, 2007-2010, HEALTH SYSTEM CHANGE (2011), available at 
http://hschange.com/CONTENT/1264/1264.pdf (“In 2010, those with incomes below 200% 
of poverty—$44,100 for a family of four—were 3.4 times more likely to report drug access 
problems as those earning 400% of poverty or more . . . .”). 
 72. Brief for AARP, supra note 70, at *5. 
 73. See Alicia I. Hogges-Thomas, An American Drug Problem: Reclaiming 
Consumers’ Rights Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 37 VT. L. REV. 737, 737 (2013) (“There 
are Americans who need their prescription drugs to stay alive.”). 
 74. See Brief for AARP, supra note 70, at *2. One could argue that an increase in 
spending on healthcare can be attributed to the dramatic development of medical technology 
that has reduced the negative effects of some diseases. However, American spending on 
healthcare continues to be much higher than what is spent in other developed countries. And 
this high cost has not translated to longer life expectancy compared to countries like Canada 
and many European countries. Thomas F. Cotter, Patents, Antitrust, and the High Cost of 
Healthcare, 13 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 1 (April 2014). 
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availability of drugs used to remedy a wide range of chronic medical 
conditions, from cancer and heart disease to bacterial infections and 
depression.75 In total, reverse payment agreements have adversely affected 
142 brand-name drugs since 2005.76 Further, brand-name drug sales of 
these drugs during the time period in which generics were not allowed to 
enter the market has been estimated at $98 billion.77 Among those drugs 
most affected are drugs commonly prescribed to elderly patients including 
Cardizem (a calcium channel blocker), Effexor (an antidepressant), Lipitor 
(a lipid lowering agent), K-Dur (a potassium replacement therapy), and 
Sinemet (an anti-Parkinson’s therapy).78 The Congressional Budget Office 
found that if generics were allowed to enter the market sooner, they would 
save Medicare billions of dollars per year.79  
V.  Congressional Action Proposed to Stop Reverse Payment Settlements 
Over the last five years, several bills that have been introduced in 
Congress aimed at eliminating reverse payment agreements, but all have 
stalled in the legislative process.80 Despite this lack of success, two bills 
                                                                                                     
 75. Pay-for-Delay Deals: Limiting Competition and Costing Consumers: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition, Policy and Consumer Rights, 113th Cong. 4 
(2013) (statement of Mike Russo, Federal Program Director for U.S. PIRG), available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/7-23-13RussoTestimony.pdf. 
 76. See U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, supra note 8.   
 77. See Id. (“Combined, these brand-name drug companies have made an estimated 
$98 billion in total sales of these drugs while the generic versions were delayed.”). 
 78. Data gathered by comparing the most popular drugs affected by reverse payment 
settlement agreements and the most common drugs prescribed to elderly patients. See id.; 
see also Drugs Commonly Prescribed to Elderly, HOMEMEDS.ORG (last visited Feb. 30, 
2014), available at http://www.homemeds.org/images/medialibrary/0620A6A37F028F33FE 
DC05FC1272963D.pdf. 
 79. See 10 years later: A Look at the Medicare Prescription Drug Program: Hearing 
Before The Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 113th Cong. 10 (2013) (statement of Max 
Richtman, National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare), available at 
http://www.ncpssm.org/PublicPolicy/LettersTestimony/Documents/ArticleID/1158/10-Years-
Later-A-Look-at-the-Medicare-Prescription-Drug-Program (stating that if the FTC were able 
to prevent reverse payment settlements from occurring, it would save Medicare $11 billion 
over the next 10 years). 
 80. See Hogges-Thomas, supra note 73, at 738 (citing four bills that have been 
introduced but stalled: America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th 
Cong. § 2563 (2009); Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (died in committee and reintroduced as S. 27 on January 25, 2011); Drug Price 
Competition Act of 2009, S. 1315, 111th Cong. (2009); Protecting Consumer Access to 
Generic Drugs Act of 2012, H.R. 3995, 112th Cong. (2012)). 
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were reintroduced in 2013 in an attempt to remedy the anticompetitive 
harm reverse payments can cause, either by eliminating reverse payments 
altogether or amending certain key provisions in the Hatch-Waxman Act.81 
To date, no new bills have been introduced in 2014.   
Sen. Amy Klobuchar introduced the Preserve Access to Affordable 
Generics Act (PAAG Act) in February 2013, which aims to “prohibit brand 
name drug companies from compensating generic drug companies to delay 
the entry of a generic drug into the market.”82 The bill notes that generic 
drugs are substantially less expensive than brand-name drugs and that the 
Hatch-Waxman Act has facilitated the prevention of entry by low-cost 
generic drugs.83 The PAAG Act would create a rebuttable presumption that 
all reverse payment agreements “have anticompetitive effects and [are] 
unlawful.”84 Courts can consider several enumerated factors when 
determining whether the parties have successfully rebutted this 
presumption, including the remaining lifetime of the patent involved and 
the value to consumers of competition in the relevant drug market.85  
In March of 2013, Sen. Al Franken introduced another bill addressing 
reverse payments, the Fair and Immediate Release of Generic Drugs Act 
(FAIR Generics Act).86 This bill proposes a slightly more patent-friendly 
solution to reverse payments than the PAAG Act; if passed, it will revise 
the “first-filer” definition by only awarding the 180-day exclusivity period 
to any ANDA applicant that has not entered into a “disqualifying 
agreement.”87 The bill defines a disqualifying agreement as an agreement 
where the applicant agrees with a brand-name manufacturer not to seek 
approval of its application or market its drug before the life of the patent in 
question expires.88 The bill also attempts to provide more clarity regarding 
litigation risk for generic manufacturers and brand name companies by 
requiring brand name companies to decide whether to file an infringement 
action within the 45-day window provided in the Hatch-Waxman Act.89  
                                                                                                     
 81. Both bills introduced are bills that have previously failed somewhere along the 
legislative process. See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 214, 113th Cong. 
(2013); see also FAIR Generics Act, S. 504, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 82. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 214, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 83. Id. at §2(a)(4)–(6). 
 84. Id. at §28(a)(2). 
 85. Id. at §28(b). 
 86. FAIR Generics Act, S. 504, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 87. Id. at §3(a)(1)(vii)(II). 
 88. Id. at §3(a)(1)(vii)(II). 
 89. Id. at §3(b)(7). 
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VI.  Analysis of Reverse payments Pre-Actavis 
A.  Antitrust Standards: A Primer 
Reverse payment agreements may have procompetitive and 
anticompetitive effects depending on the specific facts. For this reason, the 
most controversial aspect of reverse payments is the depth of antitrust 
scrutiny that courts should apply to determine their effect on competition. 
Consumers should be concerned about the court’s decision on this issue, 
because the antitrust standard courts end up applying affects the number of 
reverse payments permitted to squeeze by antitrust condemnation.  
The FTC has challenged reverse payment agreements under section 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits “unfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce.”90 Unfair methods of competition 
under section 5 include agreements that would violate section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, which prohibits agreements that unreasonably restrain 
competition.91 In determining whether an agreement unreasonably restraints 
competition, courts and the FTC generally apply one of three standards: 
1) the per se rule, 2) “quick-look” analysis, or 3) rule of reason analysis.92 
The standard of review the court applies depends on the nature of the 
conduct in question and how likely it is that the type of conduct under 
challenge has anticompetitive effects.93 If it is a type of conduct that is so 
inherently anticompetitive “as to warrant perfunctory antitrust 
condemnation without inquiry into [its] actual market impact or possible 
competitive justification,” it will be deemed per se illegal.94 Because the per 
se rule establishes a conclusive presumption of unlawfulness regardless of 
the conduct’s actual effect and thus does not permit the defendant to rebut 
                                                                                                     
 90. Unfair Methods of Competition Unlawful; Prevention by Commission, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45 (2012). 
 91. See Robert E. Entwisle & Daniel K. Storino, United States: The Uncertain Reach 
Of Section 5 Of The Federal Trade Commission Act, MONDAQ (Apr. 8, 2014), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/305416/Trade+Regulation+Practices/The+Uncertain+
Reach+Of+Section+5+Of+The+Federal+Trade+Commission+Act (“Although not expressly 
authorized to enforce the Sherman Act, the FTC reaches such conduct through Section 
5, . . .”). 
 92. See generally WILLIAM HOLMES & MELISSA MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW 
HANDBOOK § 2:9 (2012-2013 ed. 2012) (providing a thorough discussion of the various 
antitrust standards and the specific circumstances when each is used). 
 93. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that the category 
of analysis courts use is determined by its potential competitive effects). 
 94. HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 92, at § 2:10. 
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the presumption of illegality, it applies only in rare circumstances.95 
Agreements that have been deemed per se unlawful include horizontal price 
fixing and market allocation agreements.96 
If the conduct is not inherently anticompetitive but instead has both 
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects, it will be analyzed under the 
more flexible “rule of reason” standard.97 Under full-blown rule of reason 
analysis, the court weighs the conduct’s procompetitive and anticompetitive 
effects and asks whether the procompetitive effects, i.e., increased 
efficiencies or consumer benefits, outweigh the decrease in competition that 
result from such conduct.98   
Between the per se rule and rule of reason analysis lies a “continuum” 
of standards that borrow approaches from both per se and rule of reason 
analysis for conduct that does not fit in either of the two extremes.99 For 
example, the “quick look” or truncated rule of reason is used where the 
defendant’s conduct is not per se illegal, yet the conduct’s apparent 
anticompetitive effects makes it unnecessary to go through full-blown rule 
of reason analysis.100 For the quick-look rule to apply, “the conduct at issue 
and context in which it arises must have likely anticompetitive effects that 
are so intuitively obvious as to be clear without a detailed market analysis, 
                                                                                                     
 95. Id. at § 2:9. 
 96. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Examples of 
agreements that have been held unlawful pursuant to the per se rule include horizontal price 
fixing, output limitations, market allocation, and group boycotts.”). 
 97. See HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 92, at § 2:10.  
 98. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Engrs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) (“[T]he 
inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that 
promotes competition or one that suppresses competition.”). In rule of reason analysis, 
courts typically employ a burden-shifting framework. The plaintiffs bear an initial burden to 
demonstrate the defendants’ challenged behavior had an actual adverse effect on competition 
in the relevant market. If the plaintiffs satisfy their initial burden, the burden shifts to the 
defendants to offer evidence of the procompetitive effects of their agreement, and if the 
defendants can provide such proof, the burden shifts back to the plaintiffs to prove that any 
legitimate competitive benefits offered by defendants could have been achieved through less 
restrictive means. See Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 829–30 
(2010). Ultimately, the factfinder will weigh the effects and determine which effect 
predominates. If, on balance, the conduct has significant anticompetitive effects, it violates 
section 1 of the Sherman Act or, if the action is brought by the FTC, section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act. Id. 
 99. See HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 92, at § 2:9 (discussing other standards 
that are used when conduct is “difficult to place under either the per se or the rule of reason 
banner”). 
 100. Id. at § 2:10. 
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i.e., from just a ‘quick look.’”101 Under the quick-look rule, the plaintiff 
need not prove that the conduct has actual anticompetitive effects—they are 
presumed. But the defendants are permitted to offer procompetitive 
justifications for their conduct. If they do, the court must balance the 
effects; but if not, the conduct is condemned without the plaintiffs having to 
define the relevant market or establish the defendant’s market power.102 
B. Antitrust Standards Applied to Reverse Payment Settlement Agreements 
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis, circuits applied 
varying standards to reverse payment settlements. In re Cardizem CD 
Antitrust Litigation,103 a case from the Sixth Circuit, involved an agreement 
between Hoescht Marion Roussel Inc., the manufacturer of the prescription 
drug Cardizem CD (Cardizem), and Andrx Pharmaceuticals (Andrx), a 
company that would produce the generic version of that drug.104 Pursuant to 
a reverse settlement agreement, Cardizem would pay Andrx $10 million per 
year and in exchange, Andrx would refrain from marketing their drug even 
after it had received FDA approval.105 The Sixth Circuit determined that at 
its core, the reverse payment agreement was a horizontal restraint on trade 
and was thus per se unlawful.106 Therefore, the court held that the per se 
rule should apply.107 
The Second and Eleventh Circuits, however, rejected the per se rule 
and instead held that a reverse payment is valid as long as competition is 
restrained only within the exclusionary scope of the patent.108 That is, the 
                                                                                                     
 101. Id.  
 102. See id. (stating that most circuit court of appeals employ a burden shifting 
framework like that typically used in rule of reason analysis). 
 103. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that the reverse payment agreement in question was “a horizontal market allocation 
agreement and, as such, is per se illegal under the Sherman Act and under the corresponding 
state antitrust laws”). 
 104. Id. at 899. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 908. 
 107. See id. at 900 (“The Agreement . . . is a horizontal market allocation agreement 
and, as such, is per se illegal under the Sherman Act and under the corresponding state 
antitrust laws.”). 
 108. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(adopting the question presented in Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 
(11th Cir. 2005) of whether the “exclusionary effects of the agreement” exceed the “scope of 
the patent’s protection”). 
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reverse payment would not be illegal if the agreement not to enter the 
market ended before the brand-name manufacturer’s patent expired.109 
These courts noted that to expose these types of reverse payment 
agreements to antitrust scrutiny would chill settlement.110 It also runs in the 
face of the principle that a patent holder has a right to exclusion that is 
largely immune from antitrust liability.111 These courts instead held that a 
patent is presumptively lawful absent sham or baseless litigation if the 
exclusion does not exceed the scope of the exclusion permitted under the 
patent laws.112 
The Third Circuit disagreed with the scope-of-the-patent test because 
it institutes an almost irrebuttable presumption that the patent is valid.113 In 
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation,114 the court decided that such a 
presumption is unfounded, as many patents issued by the Patent and Trade 
Office are later found to be invalid or not infringed in paragraph IV 
litigation.115 Further, there are strong public policy grounds for allowing 
first filers to challenge weak patents; patents should be a limited exception 
to the general rule that ideas and innovation should be able to flow freely 
throughout an industry.116 Given these public policy concerns, the Third 
                                                                                                     
 109. See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 213 (holding that a reverse payment is presumptively 
lawful absent sham or baseless litigation if the exclusion does not exceed the scope of the 
exclusion permitted under the patent laws), Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 
1076 (11th Cir. 2005) (same), and Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 
1305 (11th Cir. 2003) (same). 
 110. See Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1064 (citing Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 
1309) (stating if the agreement is no more broad than the exclusionary scope of the patent, 
there is no need for these agreements to undergo antitrust scrutiny). 
 111. See Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1307 (stating that patent immunity can only be 
pierced if “the patentee enforced a patent with the knowledge that the patent was procured 
by fraud on the Patent Office”). 
 112. See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 208–09 (“In such a case, so long as the patent litigation 
is neither a sham nor otherwise baseless, the patent holder is seeking to arrive at a settlement 
in order to protect that to which it is presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly over the 
manufacture and distribution of the patented product.”). 
 113. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[W]e take 
issue with the scope of the patent test’s almost unrebuttable presumption of patent 
validity.”). 
 114. See id. at 218 (holding that the scope of the patent test is inappropriate and 
directed the lower courts to apply quick look analysis to reverse payment cases). 
 115. See id. at 215 (“Many patents issued by the PTO are later found to be invalid or 
not infringed, and a 2002 study conducted by the FTC concluded that, in Hatch–Waxman 
challenges made under paragraph IV, the generic challenger prevailed seventy-three percent 
of the time.”). 
 116. See id. (“This practical analysis is supported by a long line of Supreme Court cases 
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Circuit rejected the scope-of-the-patent test because it fails “to protect 
consumers from unjustified monopolies by brand name drug 
manufacturers.”117 Instead, the court held that the quick look standard 
applied, whereby the reverse payment could be used as prima facie 
evidence of an unreasonable restraint on competition.118  
VII.  FTC v. Actavis 
Given the split among the circuits, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in FTC v. Actavis, a reverse payment settlement agreement 
decision from the Eleventh Circuit with facts similar to those in other 
reverse payment settlement cases. In 1999, Solvay Pharmaceuticals 
(Solvay) filed an NDA with the FDA for a new brand-name drug called 
AndroGel.119 Later that year, petitioner Actavis (known as Watson 
Pharmaceuticals at the time) filed an ANDA with the FDA to begin 
manufacturing a generic version of AndroGel.120 Actavis, along with 
Paddock Laboratories (Paddock), another generic manufacturer, certified 
under Paragraph IV that Solvay’s patent was invalid.121 Solvay then 
initiated Paragraph IV patent infringement litigation against Actavis, 
Paddock, and the generic manufacturer Par (a pharmaceutical company 
working with Paddock).122  
Actavis’s drug was approved and was granted the 180-day first-filer 
exclusivity period.123 However, in 2006 all parties settled the patent 
litigation. Under the settlement, Actavis agreed not to bring its generic drug 
to market until sixty-five months before Solvay’s patent expired.124 
Therefore, their agreement was within the exclusionary scope of Solvay’s 
patent. Actavis also agreed to market AndroGel to urologists during the 
agreement period.125 In return, Solvay agreed to pay millions of dollars to 
                                                                                                     
recognizing that valid patents are a limited exception to a general rule of the free 
exploitation of ideas.”). 
 117. Id. at 217. 
 118. Id. at 218. 
 119. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013). 
 125. Id. 
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the respondent generic manufacturers, including an annual payment of $19 
to $30 million a year to Actavis for nine years.126 The FTC subsequently 
filed a lawsuit against Solvay, Actavis, Paddock, and Par under §5 of the 
FTC Act for agreeing to share Solvay’s monopoly profits and abandoning 
their patent challenges.127 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari, the Eleventh Circuit 
dismissed the FTC’s complaint. Applying the scope-of-the-patent test, it 
held that the reverse payment was valid because the agreement not to enter 
Solvay’s market expired before the life of the patent.128 The FTC urged the 
Court to apply the quick-look standard.129 They recognized that there are 
“possible legitimate justifications for the payment” but reverse payments 
are similar to conduct that has received per se treatment.130 Respondents, on 
the other hand, urged the Court to uphold the scope of the patent test citing 
the longstanding principle that a “patentee is exempt from the antitrust laws 
so long as the patentee does not use its patent to reach ‘beyond the limits of 
the patent monopoly.’”131 The Court decided that the quick-look rule was 
not appropriate, as reverse payments do not clearly have anticompetitive 
effects.132 
The Supreme Court also rejected the scope of the patent test, 
determining that reverse payments “can sometimes violate antitrust 
laws.”133 For this reason, the Eleventh Circuit should have allowed the 
FTC’s complaint to proceed.134 The Court resolved the contentious circuit 
split by rejecting the quick look approach, the per se rule, and the scope of 
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 129. See Brief for Petitioner at 33, FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 
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 130. Id. at 33. 
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 132. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (stating that reverse 
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presumptive standard in favor of rule of reason). 
 133. Id. at 2227. 
 134. Id. 
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the patent test, holding that reverse payments should be analyzed under rule 
of reason.135 
A.  The Court’s Guidance to Analyzing Reverse Payments (Or Lack 
Thereof) 
The Court made several general observations justifying its holding in 
Actavis that reverse payment settlements should be assessed under the rule 
of reason standard and also attempted to shed some light on how the lower 
courts should apply it.136 First, the Court recognized that reverse payments 
can be anticompetitive because they sometimes allow patent holders to 
enjoy market exclusivity even if their patents are invalid or not infringed by 
the generic entrant.137 Second, the anticompetitive effects of these 
settlements at least sometimes outweigh their potential benefits of reducing 
litigation costs and decreasing uncertainty.138 Third, the Court claimed that 
the size of the reverse payment can be a strong indicator of the market 
power of the brand name manufacturer, and thus its ability to cause 
anticompetitive harm.139 Fourth, the Court stated that applying the rule of 
reason to reverse payments is feasible because it will often not be necessary 
to test the patent’s validity.140 This statement is in response to the dissent’s 
main concern that assessing the patent’s validity, and whether the generic 
infringes in each case, will be complex and lead to uncertainty.141 Lastly, 
the Court noted some alternatives the parties could use to settle the 
infringement suit in lieu of reverse payments, including allowing the 
generic drug manufacturer to simply enter the market before the expiration 
of the patent.142 The Court recognized that cash settlements might be more 
                                                                                                     
 135. See id. at 2237 (rejecting the FTC’s argument that reverse payments should be 
analyzed under the quick look rule instead of rule of reason because reverse payments are 
not clearly unlawful). 
 136. See id. at 2234 (“[F]ive sets of considerations lead us to conclude that the FTC 
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 137. Id.  
 138. See id.  
 139. See discussion infra Part VII.B. The Court states that “the ‘size of the payment 
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Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2046, at 351 (3d ed. 2012)). 
 140. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) 
 141. Id. 
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beneficial to the settling parties but noted that if the only reason a cash 
settlement is beneficial is because it allows the parties to split monopoly 
profits, the reverse payment agreement is unlawful.143 
B. How Should Lower Courts Apply Actavis? 
Although the Court’s decision to adopt the rule of reason can be 
considered a victory for consumers because all reverse payment agreements 
are now subject to antitrust scrutiny, the Court punted the issue of how to 
apply this standard to the lower courts.144 As a result, the decision leaves 
many unanswered questions.145 The first is whether the Court actually 
expects lower courts to adopt full-blown rule of reason analysis. Some 
argue that a number of the Court’s observations suggest a framework more 
indicative of a quasi-rule of reason/quick look standard.146 The Court 
decided that testing the validity of the underlying patent would not be 
necessary because the size of the reverse payment is a “strong indicator” of 
the severity of its economic effects.147 In traditional rule of reason analysis, 
the plaintiff must initially prove that the conduct has anticompetitive effects 
either through direct evidence (i.e. supracompetitive prices or decreased 
output or quality) or circumstantial evidence (i.e. a showing that the 
defendant has sufficient market power to bring about anticompetitive 
harm).148 In Actavis, the Court established an initial presumption that the 
conduct is anticompetitive due to the unreasonable size of the reverse 
                                                                                                     
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. at 2238 (2013) (“We therefore leave to the lower courts the structuring of 
the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”). 
 145. See Peter Picht, New Law on Reverse Payment Settlements-The Agenda for Courts 
and the Legislature After the Supreme Court’s Actavis Ruling, 16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
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 146. See Joshua D. Wright, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the 
Concurrences Journal Annual Dinner 10 (Sept. 26, 2013), available at 
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direct lower courts to apply the rule-of-reason with a relatively light touch in the reverse 
payment context”). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing the balance shifting 
framework employed in rule of reason analysis). 
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payment, eliminating the need to prove market power or provide direct 
economic evidence.149 
Not requiring the lower courts to determine the strength of the patent 
would provide an enormous benefit in the form of efficiency and cost 
savings. First, by allowing the size of the payment to take the place of 
testing the patent’s validity, the lower courts can avoid deciding the major 
patent law questions. Lower courts often complain about being forced to 
litigate a patent claim within an antitrust claim because of the 
administrative and conceptual difficulties associated such a task.150 Further, 
litigating the validity and infringement issues imposes heavy burdens on the 
courts.151 Patent and antitrust are two areas of law where litigation takes an 
enormous amount of time.152 Both patent and antitrust litigation also 
heavily rely on expensive economic and industry experts. For example, the 
Eleventh Circuit stated in FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals153 that the 
reverse payment litigation resulted in “mountains of evidence—when the 
lawsuit settled, more than 40 depositions had been taken and one side alone 
had produced more than 350,000 pages of documents.”154 And even if the 
expert testimony is given and the facts are laid out, it is still often very 
difficult to determine the strength of the patent in part because some patent 
holders are unsure of the strength of their patent themselves.155 
Despite the potential benefits of relying on the size of the reverse 
payment, most practitioners and scholars have concluded that the Court was 
incorrect when it stated that the size of the settlement can replace litigating 
                                                                                                     
 149. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (stating that the Court in Actavis found 
that the size of the reverse payment could indicate the anticompetitive effect the settlement 
agreement would have on the pharmaceutical market). 
 150. See Sumner & Hatch, supra note 52, at *4 (“Lower courts have long recognized 
that the ‘turducken task’ of litigating the merits of a patent case within an antitrust case is 
conceptually and administratively difficult . . . .”). 
 151. See Sumner & Hatch, supra note 52, at *4.  
 152. See Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675, 
692 (2010) (citing a Georgetown University study that found the average antitrust case takes 
three times longer that other civil federal cases from claim to judgment). 
 153. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2012) cert. 
granted, 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012), and rev’d and remanded sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. 
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 154. See id. at 1314. 
 155. See Tania Khatibifar, Note, The Need for A Patent-Centric Standard of Antitrust 
Review to Evaluate Reverse Payment Settlements, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 1351, 1393 (2013) (“Evaluating the strength of a patent is difficult to pinpoint with 
precision and may be unknowable to the patentee itself, . . .”). 
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the patent’s validity.156 Determining the appropriateness of a reverse 
payment necessitates assessing the subjective opinion of the parties 
regarding their expected success in litigation and therefore their beliefs on 
the strength of the underlying patent.157 Therefore, in assessing the 
anticompetitive effects of a reverse payment settlement, the central issue 
should be determining the validity of the patent and whether the generic 
would infringe.158 In fact, FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright, in addressing 
the issues surrounding the Actavis decision, stated that “it would be 
surprising if courts summarily did away with the question of patent validity 
as part of their analysis altogether.”159   
Presuming that a patent is invalid when a large reverse payment is 
involved also ignores the fact that reverse payments may be used even 
when the patent is valid. A patent holder may be extremely confident about 
its validity but may be willing to pay a large sum of money to eliminate the 
risk that, if put before a jury, the patent would be found invalid.160 By 
ordering the lower courts to proceed through rule of reason analysis without 
testing the patent’s validity, the Court takes a strong defense from the 
patent holder.161 Chief Justice Roberts highlights this point in his dissenting 
opinion: 
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[T]he defendant (patent holder) will want to use the validity of his patent 
as a defense . . . . I therefore don’t see how the majority can conclude 
that it won’t normally be “necessary to litigate patent validity to answer 
the antitrust question,” . . . unless it means to suggest that the defendant 
(patent holder) cannot raise his patent as a defense in an antitrust suit. 
But depriving him of such a defense—if that’s what the majority means 
to do—defeats the point of the patent, which is to confer a lawful 
monopoly on its holder.162 
In some cases, reverse payments are the only rational choice. Patent 
infringement litigation is often unpredictable and the costs associated with 
going all the way through a patent litigation are much more than the costs 
the defendant endures in such litigation.163 Analysis of reverse payments 
must account for these circumstances.   
C.  How Would You Calculate the Size of the Settlement? 
If lower courts do in fact use the size of the settlement as a surrogate 
for the validity of the patent, the question then becomes at what amount a 
settlement will be deemed large and unjustified.164 There have been several 
different approaches offered since Actavis was decided. In Actavis, the 
Court suggested the likelihood of a reverse payment’s illegality could be 
determined by comparing its size to the expected litigation costs.165 
However, this approach suffers from a major shortcoming: it would be 
impossible to estimate the parties’ litigation costs without first determining 
the likely outcome of patent litigation, which in turn includes assessing the 
validity of the patent.166  
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FTC V. ACTAVIS: ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S DECISION 145 
A second possibility is to compare the size of the settlement to a fixed 
benchmark.167 The dissent in Actavis points to one study that estimates the 
cost of reverse payment settlement litigation in the neighborhood of $10 
million.168 Professor Herbert Hovenkamp believes this would be a useful 
benchmark to begin with, as this number is slightly higher than patent 
litigation generally.169 Once this benchmark is established, the parties can 
then dispute whether there are extenuating circumstances to justify a higher 
or lower number.170 Although not without its critics,171 this approach seems 
far more feasible than attempting to estimate the expected litigation costs in 
each case. If courts do decide to use the size of the reverse payment in lieu 
of testing the validity of the patent, the fixed benchmark is the logical 
approach, as long as courts account for circumstances specific to each case.  
The most likely answer to the question of how lower courts will treat 
reverse payments post-Actavis is they will initially apply something more 
akin to full-blown rule of reason, using the size of the reverse payment as 
one of many factors in determining the potential adverse effect it has on 
competition and consumers. The initial burden will rest with the plaintiffs 
to show that the agreement has an adverse effect on competition. The 
plaintiff, whether it is the government or a private party, will have to show 
that the agreement delayed entry of the generic drug into the market past an 
expected entry date. Analyzing the strength of the patent, the size of the 
payment, and the expected litigation costs if litigation were to continue will 
prove the anticompetitive effect.  
If the plaintiff is able to show that the payment has the potential of 
having an adverse effect on competition, the defendant drug manufacturers 
can offer evidence of the procompetitive effects of the agreement. As 
                                                                                                     
 167. See Wright, supra note 146, at 12. 
 168. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2244 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
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discussed above, the manufacturer could offer evidence that the payment 
was given in order to avoid costly litigation or the payment is indicative of 
the branded manufacturer’s subjective opinion of the likelihood of winning 
its patent infringement suit after assessing the risk of litigation. The burden 
will then shift back to the plaintiff to show that there were less restrictive 
means of achieving those competitive benefits, including allowing the 
generic manufacturer to enter the market in lieu of a cash settlement. The 
dissent in Actavis, however, is skeptical of the early-entry solution, as it 
may reduce the chances the parties will decide to settle because they have 
less with which to bargain.172 
Although a lengthy rule of reason analysis may be required initially, 
lower courts may be able to adopt a more truncated rule of reason analysis 
given a period of “economic learning and experience . . . .”173 This is the 
kind of experience the FTC would argue courts have already developed.174  
In Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC,175 a case involving an ancillary restraint 
on competition between Polygram and Warner Communications, the D.C. 
Circuit endorsed the Commission’s view that some conduct can be held 
presumptively unlawful if the anticompetitive effects are “obvious from the 
nature of the challenged conduct.”176 This same case-specific approach can 
be eventually applied to reverse payment agreements. Although the Court 
in Actavis has found that evidence is not yet strong enough to completely 
condemn reverse payment agreements, new economic evidence may arise 
allowing courts to find a presumption of illegality in certain cases.177 
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VIII.  Post-Actavis Implications on Drug Prices and Consumer Welfare 
Actavis holds that the rule of reason applies to reverse payment 
settlement agreements, rejecting the in-effect “safe harbor” for agreements 
permitting the generic to enter prior to the patent’s expiration date.178 
Although the effect of this decision on future reverse payment litigation has 
been discussed at length, an important question still remains; will the 
Court’s decision have an appreciable impact on drug prices and thus reduce 
healthcare costs for consumers? Some argue that it will. On the day Actavis 
was decided, the New York Attorney General exclaimed that “[t]oday’s 
ruling is a victory for millions of Americans who depend on generic drugs 
to treat illness and pain.”179 The AARP issued a press release stating that 
Actavis was a win for consumers because it should stop excessively 
extended patent monopolies that create costs which trickle through our 
national healthcare system and burden those who need to treat chronic 
illnesses.180 As a testament to the importance of this decision, the National 
Legislative Association on Prescription Drugs sent a letter to the Supreme 
Court just before Actavis was decided, urging the Court to find reverse 
payments anticompetitive, as “‘few cases before the Supreme Court this 
session could have more direct impact on consumers’ pocketbooks’ than 
this one.”181  
A.  What Actavis Means for Consumers 
The Actavis decision should result in a decrease in anticompetitive 
reverse payment agreements, which will increase consumer access to 
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generic drugs. The decision provides the FTC with more room to 
aggressively challenge reverse payment settlements, and the FTC has 
indicated that it intends to do so.182 Actavis also creates more uncertainty in 
patent infringement litigation, possibly deterring such litigation from taking 
place.183 However, there is a possibility that drug manufacturers could shift 
toward other, more discrete means of settlement in an attempt to avoid 
antitrust scrutiny.  
The Actavis decision makes it easier for the FTC to bring an antitrust 
claim against drug manufacturers. Practitioner Amanda Reeves believes 
this to be true because the threshold for pleading a reverse payment case 
under rule of reason is relatively low, making it more difficult for 
defendants to prevail on a motion to dismiss.184 In some circumstances, the 
FTC may even be able to survive a 12(b)(6) motion if the manufacturers 
offer evidence that their settlement is not anticompetitive. The Actavis 
Court noted that while although “a reverse payment [may reflect] traditional 
settlement considerations,” this possibility “does not justify dismissing the 
FTC’s complaint.”185 This is particularly true where “the settlement 
includes both a payment that exceeds litigation costs and a provision for 
delayed entry.”186  
Reverse payments, and thus patent infringement litigation, may also 
become less prevalent because litigation may be perceived as riskier to the 
parties post-Actavis. Settling parties will face increased uncertainty in 
determining whether courts will find their agreement unlawful. Initially, 
parties will only be able to speculate as to how the size of the settlement 
will fit in to district courts’ rule of reason analysis and what specific 
mitigating factors defendants will be able to use to prove that their 
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agreements are lawful.187 There is also uncertainty about the likelihood that 
the FTC will investigate the settlement and attempt to block it before its 
inception. 188 Although the Court granted the FTC more power to challenge 
these settlements and the FTC has stated it intends to use this power, it is 
more likely that the FTC will challenge only those agreements that are 
clearly anticompetitive.189 But now that every reverse payment agreement is 
open to challenge, drug manufacturers might be more hesitant to enter into 
these agreements in the first place.   
Drug manufacturers may attempt to avoid the Actavis decision by 
using means of compensation other than cash. Although the Actavis 
decision provides guidelines on how lower courts should address monetary 
reverse payments, it does not give guidance on how courts should assess the 
legality of “non-monetary” reverse payments. In some situations, the brand 
name manufacturer does not provide monetary compensation to the 
generic.190 Instead the parties may engage in an ancillary business 
transaction such as a cross-licensing or supply agreement.191 For example, 
in In re Nexium Litigation,192 a generic manufacturer, in exchange for an 
agreement to delay entry was provided an exclusive license to distribute the 
branded product instead of being paid in cash.193 Lower courts are split as to 
whether Actavis’ definition of “reverse payment” should be read to include 
any transfer of value between the parties. The Nexium court held that a 
payment need not be in money to constitute an antitrust violation under the 
Actavis Court’s framework.194 Instead, the court did “not see fit to read into 
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the opinion a strict limitation of its principles to monetary-based 
arrangements alone,” thus concluding drug manufacturers cannot avoid 
liability by payments in kind.195 However, the court in In re Lamictal Direct 
Purchaser Antitrust Litigation196 held that Actavis should be read to only 
apply reverse payment agreements where the consideration for delayed 
entry is monetary.197 The Lamictal court reasoned that the Supreme Court 
deliberately distinguished reverse payments from “traditional” and 
“commonplace” forms of settlement.198 The Lamictal court also stated that 
the definition of “reverse payment” used in Actavis was not meant to 
include every situation where the patent holder confers a financial benefit 
on the generic.199 
Although there will likely be considerable debate in the future as to 
how Actavis will be applied to non-monetary compensation agreements, 
anticompetitive reverse payment settlements that are not enshrined in an 
express agreement will inevitably make it more difficult for the FTC to 
prove anticompetitive conduct.200 The possibility of non-monetary reverse 
payments introduces the risk that drug manufacturers will find clever ways 
around the Actavis holding by “hiding” their settlement agreements in more 
benign arrangements.201 It therefore seems likely that reverse payment 
agreements will continue to exist and be challenged by the FTC. 
B.  The Likelihood of Congressional Action 
If the Court’s decision in Actavis is not enough to eliminate the 
negative impact of reverse payment agreements on consumers altogether, 
another option is congressional action. As discussed above, there have been 
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several bills introduced by the both the 112th and 113th Congresses aimed 
at eliminating anticompetitive reverse payments.202 Although congressional 
action is likely necessary to further limit the opportunity for parties to enter 
into anticompetitive agreements, any law passed must be careful not to 
upset the Actavis Court’s determination that some reverse payments can 
have procompetitive effects, or at the very least do not have an adverse 
effect on competition.  
For this reason, Sen. Klobuchar’s PAAG Act will likely fail.203 The 
Actavis Court unequivocally stated that reverse payments should not be 
deemed presumptively illegal.204 The PAAG Act has been heavily criticized 
because it essentially deems all reverse payments per se unlawful. It would 
thus eliminate those reverse payment agreements that are conducted to 
compensate parties for litigation costs.205 Also, deeming reverse payments 
per se illegal runs contrary to the established antitrust principle that per se 
illegality should apply to conduct only when courts have had sufficient 
experience with a certain type of conduct and determined that it is almost 
always anticompetitive.206 And given that this bill has been introduced and 
rejected in the past, it seems unlikely to pass at present.207 This is especially 
true after the Actavis decision, as Congress is now more likely to see how 
the decision will play out in the lower courts before deciding that further 
legislation is necessary.208 Sen. Klobuchar has stated that she intends to go 
forward with the bill, but the Court’s decision in Actavis essentially makes 
the key provisions of her bill moot. 
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A more promising Congressional bill is Sen. Franken’s proposed FAIR 
Generics Act.209 Research has shown that the anticompetitive effects of 
reverse payment settlements are increased when the settlement is with the 
first filer and the first filer does not relinquish its right to the 180-day 
exclusivity period.210 Under the provisions of the FAIR Generics Act, any 
generic manufacturer that wins a patent challenge in the district court or is 
not sued by a brand-name drug manufacturer can share the first filer’s 180-
day exclusivity period.211 This would ultimately increase the number of 
generics allowed to enter. Some, including the Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association, argue that the FAIR Generics Act will result in countervailing 
anticompetitive effects.212 They fear that removing the 180-day exclusivity 
period will remove the incentive for generics to challenge weak patents thus 
eliminating the “checks and balances” built into the Hatch-Waxman Act.213 
This will allow weak or invalid patents to survive, ultimately reducing the 
number of generics entering the market where patent protection should not 
exist. 
But a strong argument can be made that this bill has the potential to 
end the “unintended, structural flaw in” the Hatch-Waxman Act: “parked 
exclusivities” that block generic introduction.214 It also has the potential to 
actually increase the incentive for generics to introduce new versions of 
drugs into the market. If the exclusivity period could be shared by a number 
of generic manufacturers, there is nothing stopping generic manufacturers 
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who are not first filers to also challenge potentially weak or invalid patents 
and thus enter the market sooner.215 Therefore, passage of the FAIR 
Generics Act or a similar bill has the greatest potential of increasing generic 
entry into the market without holding all reverse payment settlements 
presumptively unlawful. 
C.  The Effect of the Affordable Care Act on the Adverse Effects of Reverse 
Payments 
The Courts decision in Actavis will likely reduce the number of 
harmful reverse payment agreements drug manufacturers enter into. For 
those agreements that survive, poor and elderly consumers will be further 
insulated from inflated drug prices due to the enactment of the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA).216 The ACA expands Medicaid coverage to an estimated 
17 million additional low-income adults and children.217 Congress also 
expects the expansion program to provide cost savings for states that 
choose to implement the expansion program in the form of reduced 
healthcare spending for the uninsured.218  
The implementation of the ACA also helps reduce prescription drug 
prices for the elderly. Several provisions of the ACA aim at reducing drug 
costs for seniors. Under the ACA, Medicare patients with a gap in drug 
coverage will receive a one-time $250 rebate to help pay for prescription 
drugs.219 Further, brand name drug companies will be forced to provide a 
50% discount on drugs for seniors who face a gap in coverage.220 Expanded 
drug coverage should increase the level of drug use and the probability of 
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receiving prescription drugs is expected to increase among elderly 
Americans.221 
With this dramatic increase in insurance coverage, fewer Americans 
will be paying for their prescription drugs out-of-pocket.222 Therefore, 
while the health insurer must still pay near monopoly prices for patented 
drugs, consumers are only required to pay a price closer to its competitive 
market value through their co-pay.223 The result of the introduction of the 
ACA in relation to reverse payment settlements will be a shift in the 
“deadweight loss” created by monopoly pricing from the consumer to the 
private or public health insurer.224 So as anticompetitive reverse payments 
may continue to be a problem for Medicaid and Medicare, they should have 
less of a direct impact on newly insured poor and elderly consumers under 
the ACA. 
IX.  Conclusion 
Congress intended the Hatch-Waxman Act “to make available more 
low cost generic drugs . . . .”225 Reverse payment settlement agreements 
frustrate this purpose, as they provide incentives for drug manufacturers to 
conspire rather than compete.226 Those reverse payment agreements that 
have an adverse effect on competition disproportionately burden older 
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Americans and those who are uninsured.227 These populations bear the 
brunt of the negative effects because they are the most likely to live on 
fixed incomes and need prescription drugs to treat chronic medical 
conditions. Actavis was the Court’s attempt to reestablish the purpose for 
which Hatch-Waxman was enacted by narrowing a loophole that runs 
contrary to its intent. Although it is too early to tell, Actavis should reduce 
the number of anticompetitive reverse payments, increasing the number of 
generics available to the people who need them the most. This decision, 
along with expanded Medicaid coverage under the ACA, promises to 
reduce the number of people in our population whose health is deteriorating 
despite the fact that there are helpful medications available.  
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